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HOW TO IMPROVE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

BY EX-MAYOR HART OF BOSTON, MAYOR DAVIDSON OF BALTIMORE, MAYOR BISHOP OF BUFFALO, AND MAYOR NOONAN OF ST. LOUIS.

IT is generally felt and often stated that the government of American cities is a failure. At the same time it is conceded that our system of national and State governments is a success. If the government of the country at large and of the separate States be reasonably satisfactory, it is humiliating that we should make a failure of city government. Is it possible that we can govern the whole, and must fail in governing a part? I do not think so. Those who consider all American city government a failure have latterly pointed to Glasgow, Birmingham, and Berlin as models for us to follow. But in our national and State constitutions we have not followed foreign models very closely, and that seems to offer some reason for the belief that in matters of city government we shall do well to propose and execute what is best under our particular circumstances. Mr. Simon Sterne points out that American cities differ very widely, both in theory and in practice, from the cities of other countries. It is to be inferred that the discovery and the administration of the best government for American cities are an American problem, to be solved on the basis of American facts and precedents.

The American theory is that the State creates cities, that cities have no rights not conferred by the State, and that the State may destroy municipal corporations at will. Does it not follow, then, that the lack of efficiency so generally charged against our city governments should be laid in part at the door of the States that created the cities and gave them what power and character they have? If the national government had the same power over States which the latter have over cities, is it not

likely that our States would be in the same predicament in which we find our cities? As a matter of fact, the rights of our States have been fully saved while we have established and maintained a national constitution; but if the towns and cities of America ever had any inherent rights, they have been disregarded or destroyed by the States. Yet it is not, perhaps, a mere dream to think that towns and cities might bear the same relations to a State which the latter bears to the national government.

The larger part of the population of Massachusetts lives in cities. Under our law this majority is deemed incapable of making and changing the fundamental law of cities; but as part of the commonwealth the residents of our cities are supposed to have almost sovereign power. Boston as a city is treated as incapable of self-government; in conjunction with smaller cities and country towns it is thought nearly omnipotent or omniscient, and certainly most wise and independent. In the country at large, and in every State where there are considerable cities, the taxes, the debts, the public works, and the number of public servants of the municipalities greatly exceed those of the States as such. Yet the States have full self-government, and the great municipalities have not. As the self-government of States is a help rather than a hindrance to national self-government, is it not possible and desirable to let our great municipalities enjoy a larger measure of local self-government? We have established and vindicated our national government. Our State governments have never been in danger, and are not now. The constitutional duty of the immediate future, it seems to me, lies in the direction of simplifying, improving, and, perhaps, enlarging municipal government.

The true model and the best precedent for the constitution of an American city, I venture to think, are to be found in our national and State constitutions. They all draw the right line between legislative, judicial, and executive work. This distribution of public power appears to be of fundamental importance. It is probably safe to think that the main reason why so many of our city governments fail to give satisfaction is to be found in the exercise of legislative and executive power by the same municipal officer or body. Some American mayors or other administrative officers still exercise judicial functions, whence the whole class are popularly called magistrates and addressed as "your honor," as if

every mayor was a judge, or ought to be. Aldermen and councilmen, whose duty is plainly legislative, have too often done purely administrative work, at times under State authority, and usually to the detriment of responsible government. To check the exercise of administrative work by aldermen or councilmen, the power and prerogative of mayors have of late been greatly increased ; and there is some danger of overloading mayors with such legislative work as an undue share in the laying of taxes or making appropriations. The less a mayor has to do with these, beyond making recommendations and exercising the veto power, the better. Give the mayor full executive power, but keep him out of legislative work. That there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, is an axiom quoted by *The Federalist* from Montesquieu.

It is not certain that the mayor should have the absolute power of appointing his subordinates or any other public officers. The power of removal should be vested in the mayor ; but the appointing power may properly be limited by giving the board of aldermen the right to confirm or reject. The mayor should have the veto power over all acts of his city council. In turn, he should be required to give reasonable information to the city council on his own acts, as well as on those of the departments under him ; and executive appointments may well undergo the ordeal of aldermanic acceptance or rejection in order to prevent mayors from ever thinking that, for the time, they are supreme. The danger that good appointees may be rejected is probably not greater than that hasty or ill-considered appointments will be made. The executive and the legislative branch should be separated ; they should not be wholly independent of each other, for the government is to be one, with its duties carefully separated.

As the city council should have the power to order taxes and to make appropriations, beside making ordinances and authorizing public works, its prerogative is necessarily great and needs balancing. The best check to hasty legislation and foolish appropriations is found in a legislature of two branches, each having a negative on the other. If the board of aldermen have the power of passing upon executive appointments, the other branch, usually called the common council, may well have the power and prerogative of originating appropriations. Aldermen should be stripped of all administrative work, if we are to

have a responsible government of cities ; but the other chamber should have equal power with the board of aldermen. The system has worked well in our national and State legislatures, and should be adopted in all cities. It is convenient to make the board of aldermen small, and the common council sufficiently numerous to give all classes a representation and spokesmen. All public servants should receive salaries, and all perquisites should be abolished.

A city council of two branches, it seems to me, is absolutely essential. The city council holds the purse-strings, it orders the taxes, and it incurs the debt for which all taxable property is in effect mortgaged. This power is so great that it should not be exercised by one body alone, nor until the matter is at least twice discussed in public by rival branches. Even under a public law limiting taxes and municipal indebtedness, some discretion will rest with the city council. This discretion is less likely to be abused by two rival houses than by one house, especially if the latter be so small as to resemble a board of directors. And city men must learn at their peril that in the matter of dollars and cents their city council is more important than their State legislature.

A clear division of executive departments, I am aware, is extremely difficult, and has not been attained anywhere. The departments in Washington are a jumble, except that the cabinet offices are fairly defined. Below there is less system than the cause of good government requires. City departments are equally confusing, at least in the large cities. Here, then, is a great problem for city councils to solve. This calls for a high order of talent ; and that we shall never command unless we dignify city government by giving it some independence. In an emergency only, the national government will interfere with a State ; the State may well show the like spirit to its great cities, the homes of wealth and commerce. One of the reasons why men of affairs take so small a part in the government of their own cities is, perhaps, the fact that States can rule cities at will. A remedy is sought, not in self-government, which is nearly extinct, but in appeals to State legislatures. Possibly for the same reason the municipal spirit is so weak in the greatest of all our cities. Yet we ought to learn our first lesson in government and public duty in our own homes. New England still has its priceless town meetings,

where local affairs are settled in the best manner possible. There our best men received their early training. The town of Boston was never incorporated. It exercised prescriptive rights. The cities of America are creatures of the State. When our city taxes are squandered, or we think they are squandered, the legislature of the State, with its country members, is invoked to supply a remedy. Instead of outreasoning and outvoting our opponents in city affairs, as we do in State and national elections, we appeal to men who pay no tax in our cities and could have no intimate acquaintance with the giant problems of city government. No city, I fear, will ever be well governed that does not invite the highest talent, and that fails to hold out the highest inducement to men of light and leading. The problem of city government, I believe, can never be solved except by the city itself and by its home citizens. Instead of relieving men of municipal duties, the latter should be increased. And a great duty well discharged should find its just reward.

A city government should be a continuous body. Mayors should be elected for periods of three or four years. If for three years, aldermen should be elected for four years, one-fourth of their number being elected annually, or one-half biennially. Councilmen should be elected for at least two years, and half the council should be elected annually. The New England system of annually electing an entire city government, it seems to me, is an unfortunate misapplication of town methods. The great Chief-Justice Shaw, who framed our city charter, failed to perceive, possibly, that cities require a representative government, and that towns do not. It was he who made our New England aldermen semi-executive officers and gave us one-year governments.

While I differ with Chief-Justice Shaw and other lawyers, it is quite clear in my mind that we need lawyers of the first order—men like Shaw and Judge Dillon—if we intend to put the constitutions and laws of our great cities upon a firm and lasting basis. I think that the power of our great cities should be increased at the expense of our States. In that work of the future we shall need the best legal talent the country has. We shall need great organizers. We need a *Federalist* for our great American cities. But the best law and the best city constitution cannot take the place of good citizenship. Indeed, the cause here alluded to by a mere layman, who has been twice mayor of Boston,

is altogether hopeless if our leading cities are to be mere markets, and if citizens consider their public duty discharged by the payment of taxes, a vote when the time comes, and habitual grumbling at our own government. Our government is about what we make it. If it be inefficient, we have made it so. If we desire to improve it, we are free to do our best. But no great improvement is possible until the majority, animated by public and worthy motives, takes actual hold and vindicates public opinion duly informed and properly guided. We must do for our cities what the fathers of a century ago did so well for the State and the nation.

THOMAS N. HART,
Ex-Mayor of Boston.

THE essential difficulty in the administration of the affairs of the majority of American cities arises from three principal causes :

First, The apathy and indifference which the majority of the better class of citizens display with regard to taking an active part in municipal government. This disposition can have no other tendency than to gradually delegate the most important functions of a municipality to those whose training and qualifications poorly fit them for the discharge of duties involving large responsibility.

There is no American city where this condition of things has not been a matter of more than ordinary solicitude among the earnest thinkers, who, while recognizing the dangerous tendencies involved in the avoidance of the duties and responsibilities of public office, have yet discovered no remedy. How vastly different is the condition of affairs in some prominent cities of the old world—Berlin, for instance—where a refusal to serve in some of the highest municipal offices is punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both ; where the obligation to do so is regarded in such a sacred light that neglect or indifference is at once a mark of dishonor and unworthy citizenship ! Were it possible always to secure the services of the ablest and best citizens only, the course of legislation and the general conduct of the affairs of a municipal government would invariably be upon those lines of common-

sense and good judgment in which the very highest degree of success is attained in the private walks of life and business enterprise. Under present conditions the danger is frequently incurred that the wise acts of one council may be frustrated by some subsequent legislation, characterized by cupidity, ignorance, and incapacity.

Second, A most serious drawback is the very narrow limit of the powers of the municipality under the State legislature.

Suppose the case of a private corporation which attempted to do business surrounded by the hampering and restrictive measures which from time to time are suggested to the average country legislator, whose majority power confers upon him the privilege of continually agitating the hayseed clustered around his brain, in efforts to devise new systems which will relieve him, and throw the burden of taxation upon his supposed legitimate prey dwelling in the city. No business can be transacted by our cities without the practical supervision of a State legislature, which rarely realizes that the city has any rights worthy of much respect; and therefore the popular idea of self-government is a mere illusion in the majority of our municipal corporations, for no power exists, in reality, to do any act for the well-being of the citizens, or for the advancement of the material interests of the community, save such as may have previously, in one form or another, received the sanction of the State authorities. I maintain, therefore, that cities of certain grades should hold in many respects the identical relation to the States that the States hold to the general government of the country, and while proper and reasonable restrictions should not be relinquished,—restrictions preventing the disregard of the ordinary principles of law and order,—the city should be invested with discretionary powers for the transaction of its business to much the same extent as is allowed to private corporations.

The fact is, however, quite undeniable that it would be unwise to make such a radical change in the system of municipal government unless the *ensemble* of the local body politic is also changed, and elevated in mental and moral tone, so as to avoid the misuse of the enlarged powers which would thus be acquired. In other words, it is conceded that to small capacity, discrimination, and judgment should only be allowed limited scope for attempts at the exercise of these qualities; and hence the second proposi-

tion is interdependent and conditional upon the first suggestion of the need of a more enlarged interest upon the part of the best citizens in the affairs of government.

Third, The mayor should have absolute power of appointing and removing his subordinates, and should, in that manner, incur substantially the sole responsibility for the manner in which the business of the city is conducted. The ability of a council to interfere, under a power to confirm or reject nominations, when some political favorite is to be served or saved, is an injustice to the mayor charged with the duty of appointment, and often hinders the proper transaction of business ; it places in office or retains in position a much lower order of talent than public opinion or the self-respect of the appointing officer would allow, were the power to appoint final and absolute.

There is no reason why our city governments should be considered failures, and they would not be so considered if the majority of the people who live in cities desired their affairs to be conducted on the simple lines of common-sense and prudence which are followed in every branch of private enterprise, and had the energy to enforce their wishes ; but the lamentable truth is that such is *not* the case. No man who has had opportunity to observe closely can come to any other conclusion than that the application of strict business principles to city business is calculated to excite derision upon the part of the masses.

This is illustrated in almost the majority of instances where the interest of a city and that of a private corporation come in contact ; for in such cases it is invariably charged that those who stand firmly for the protection of the city are manifesting a hostile spirit toward " public improvements," and hence conscientious city officials are subject to ridicule for doing just what a private individual would be censured for not doing.

The application of business principles in requiring employees of our cities to discharge their duty to their employer—the corporation—with fidelity, does not meet with the approval of the whole community, for it is frequently urged as an ameliorating circumstance, in cases of neglect of duty, that the " efficient party service" of the offender is ample cause for mitigating the censure which has been incurred.

The common-sense recognition of the elementary principles of finance is often ignored in a manner which would be considered

unpardonable in private affairs : loans are created, but the important element of a sinking-fund, adequately providing for the hour of redemption, is frequently lost sight of, and it is vastly more popular to experience the temporary enjoyment of a low tax-rate than to make proper provision to avoid the incubus of debt.

In conclusion, the whole question of more efficient city government will be solved when politics are permitted to have no more place in the management of our cities than in individual or corporate enterprise, when the individual citizen realizes the obligation to do his part in holding public office whenever called upon to perform such service, when the powers of self-government are not usurped by the State, and when responsibility is lodged in one chief executive officer whose discretion, ability, character, and standing will be a sufficient guarantee to the community that its best interests will be conserved with absolute fidelity.

ROBERT C. DAVIDSON,
Mayor of Baltimore.

THAT municipal government in American cities is unsatisfactory in results is an established fact, and the city of Buffalo is not an exception to the rule.

Indeed, through the courtesy of the unreliable Eleventh Census our city is made to appear as one of the shining examples of expensive municipal administration. But while that report does great injustice to Buffalo by its inaccurate statements of administrative expenses, yet it is unfortunately true that the results attained are not commensurate with the cost.

Why this condition should long exist is a problem not easy of solution, and the slight success attending the most earnest efforts to correct it is the source of the keenest disappointment to those who are intrusted with executive office. From a careful consideration of the subject, and after the experience of nearly two years as mayor of Buffalo, I am convinced that the fault is not entirely with those who are intrusted with administrative office, but is deeply rooted in our system of municipal control. The fundamental law of our cities is a charter. This charter is granted by legislative enactment, and provides with minutest detail the plan of government, the particular officers, their specific

duties, and the limitation of their powers. I believe that this system is not the one to secure the best results, for the reason that the people of the several cities, who are the ones most interested in the powers to be exercised under these grants or charters, do not have enough voice in the framing of those powers. The municipal government cannot fairly be compared with or modelled strictly after the State or national government, because the needs it must serve and the difficulties it must overcome are so numerous, so diverse, so peculiarly local in character, and so intimately affect the individual and the family. And yet the very difference seems to me to be the strongest reason why cities should be permitted, like the States, to govern themselves, under certain general and well-defined restrictions.

The Legislature of New York is largely composed of men who, elected from what may be termed rural constituencies, are unacquainted with the actual conditions of living in our large cities, and with the great questions that must be considered and settled by the officers of those cities. And this Legislature, at its last session, enacted seven special laws relating to pavements, schoolhouses, parks, etc., in the city of Buffalo, of the necessity for which only six of the one hundred and sixty members could have any personal knowledge; and that was an unusually small number of such enactments for one session. It is true that these special laws are usually enacted only at the request of the municipality interested; but it is also true that, in the past, proposed laws of great importance to cities have been delayed for years, and sometimes defeated, after repeated requests for their enactment from the cities concerned, and other laws, relating to the government of some of our larger cities, have been enacted, against the most earnest protest of the people of those cities, to serve personal or partisan ends. It is not unreasonable to believe that better results would be attained by permitting such legislation to be considered and settled by the people of the several cities, or their immediate representatives, rather than by a body of disinterested strangers, ignorant of the particular needs, and not responsible to the people of those cities for the result.

I believe, therefore, that the legislative control over municipal governments should only be to provide general laws for the incorporation of cities and limiting the corporate powers that may be exercised; and that each city should be permitted to

frame its own charter, subject to those restrictions, and adopt and amend it by vote of its own citizens. I am quite sure that if such power were intrusted to the citizens of Buffalo, its exercise would be uniformly for the benefit of the city. The powers of municipal government should, I believe, be vested in legislative and executive departments; the legislative department to be elective and to consist of two bodies, one elected from and representing different wards or other divisions, and the other composed of a smaller number of members, elected by and representing the whole city. Each body should be a check upon the other. The executive power should be vested in the mayor and, under his supervision, in the heads of different departments. The mayor and such heads of departments as do not require special qualifications should be elective; those heads of departments whose duties require technical knowledge or professional skill and training should be appointed by the mayor. The power of removal should accompany the power of appointment, but should be so guarded as to prevent its abuse. The new charter of the city of Buffalo, enacted by the Legislature of New York at its last session, is, in my judgment, a fair exposition of the proper distribution and limitations of municipal powers. It was framed by a committee of representative citizens, whose selection and deliberations were suggestive of a constitutional convention, and is, I think, a fair example of the practical working of the system I have outlined.

But while the adoption of "home rule" for cities would avoid many of the present difficulties of municipal government, there are many evils that can be cured by the people themselves. The affairs of a city are simply the business of a great corporation, and should be administered as such. The members of the legislative body or bodies constitute the board of directors, and the people, who are the stockholders, should exercise the same care in electing them to secure competent and fit men as they do in choosing the officers and directors of their private corporations. The business methods of the city should be as simple as possible, and the subordinates in the several departments should be chosen with proper regard for their fitness and ability to perform the duties of the positions they are to fill; they should receive such compensation as is reasonable for the services rendered, and their number should be limited by the work to be done. The best re-

sults can be most often secured by infrequent changes ; yet retention in office, whatever the grade, either elective or appointive, should be conditioned solely upon honest and successful service.

Our cities increase so rapidly in population, surprising the most sanguine students, that to provide the improvements necessary for the health and convenience of the people requires large expenditures and burdensome taxation, and it is in expenditures for such improvements that the greatest abuses have existed. Let us, however, have home control of our own municipal affairs, unhampered by undue legislative interference or control, and I am confident that the thinking, active, working taxpayers will insist that their public business be conducted solely for the public good, and then the problem of the government of cities will be much nearer solution.

CHARLES F. BISHOP,
Mayor of Buffalo.

THE problem of city government is one worthy of the most careful consideration of our wisest and most conservative people. As far as possible the plan should be in accord with that of our national and State governments. In the nature of things there must be considerable dissimilarity. The bulwark of freedom is the division of power. The safety of the people is the system of checks of one department on another. It is a practical proposition, universally acknowledged and acted upon in business circles, and one which lies at the foundation of bookkeeping, that mistakes can only be avoided where the work of one department is subject to review by another, and where the work of both must correspond, forming thereby a mathematical trial balance.

The framers of our federal constitution recognized this principle and expressed it in that instrument. The division of power into three coördinate, yet distinct and restraining, branches is the acme of governmental wisdom. The division of the legislative into two branches, elected by different means, for different terms, and from different classes of the community, has proven most salutary. Thus the Senate, elected by the legislature (or the whole body of the people of the State), is generally composed of a different class from the House, which is elected by communities

or localities. The former may be said to represent capital ; the latter, labor. Each holds a check upon the other, so that, between the extreme views and wishes of the two, legislation is necessarily tinged with conservatism, and hence safety. It may be that the result represents only a compromise, but the medium in the political as well as in the intellectual world is always the safest. The executive is also a check on the legislative branch. It is not superior, because laws may be enacted even without the consent of the executive. The keystone in the arch is, however, to be found in the judicial branch, which neither originates nor enforces the laws, but which construes the acts of both the other branches in the light of constitutional authority, and without which the other two would, possibly, fall into a conflict as to their respective rights and powers. Our States have corresponding branches. Cities, however, at best have only two of the three branches—that is, the executive and legislative. The keystone of the arch is missing. Hence the struggles for supremacy between the other two branches. Hence the unseemly and oftentimes injurious conflicts between the two, always the result of a grasping for more power by the one or the other, or a trenching of one branch upon the prerogatives of the other. There is no judiciary to curb and restrain and define the powers and the duties of each to the other. The courts of the State must needs, therefore, be appealed to in such cases, and this is almost always resented as the introduction of a foreign element into the controversy.

The government of St. Louis is as nearly perfect as that of any city in the United States, and yet, while it is modelled upon the theory and plan of our federal and State governments, and has the executive and legislative branches, with the veto power in the former, and the division of the latter into a higher, select, and smaller body, and a lower, larger, and more essentially representative body, and while the concurrence of both branches of the legislative and that of the executive are necessary to the enacting of any law, except that the legislative can overrule the executive veto by the necessary vote, still the judicial branch is wanting, and the result is that from time to time the other two branches have encroached upon the powers or prerogatives of each other, or, in attempting to do so, have created “deadlocks,” which necessarily impair the efficiency of the public service. In St.

Louis there are further checks for the preservation of the rights of the people, which also render frauds and dishonesty in public office almost impossible without being speedily detected. Thus the comptroller is the fiscal officer, and his approval is necessary to all expenditures. The auditor sees that no money is spent unless there has been an appropriation for the purpose. The treasurer cannot pay out a cent unless ordered by both the comptroller and auditor. These are elected officers, heavily bonded and directly responsible to the people. No financial difficulties or shortages can occur without the connivance of all three. In addition, there is another check upon the reckless or extravagant appropriation or expenditure of public money for street purposes, in the fact that the legislative branch cannot pass an ordinance for such purposes unless it is recommended by the board of public improvements, which is composed of five members appointed by the mayor, and a president who is elected by a direct vote of the people.

The charter of this city was adopted in pursuance of a constitutional grant of the power given to it to have a board of fifteen freeholders propose a charter to the people of the city for their adoption, which should, when adopted, be the organic law of the city. The instrument was most carefully prepared by eminent citizens, many of them of national reputation, and while it is necessarily defective in respect to the absence of the judicial branch, it is nevertheless confidently believed to be the best city charter in the land. In fact, it has in fifteen years' experience proved so satisfactory that it has been embodied almost literally in the statutes of this State as the law for the government of all cities having a population of over 100,000 inhabitants, and its principal features have been adopted for the government of all cities, towns, and villages, however small.

The chief difficulty that has so far been experienced is in the requirement that all appointments of the executive shall be confirmed by the council (or upper branch of the legislative power). It has occurred that the members of the council have attempted to use the confirming power to coerce the discretion or prerogative of the executive as to whom he shall appoint, by refusing to confirm his nominee because they thought some one else ought to be appointed. This has caused temporary inconvenience, annoyance, and injury to the public service; but such unlawful assump-

tion of authority, such flagrant abuse of the confirming power, has happily been of rare occurrence, and has always been rebuked by the people at the next election, and the persons so abusing their trust have been promptly relegated to private life.

All governments necessarily curtail the natural rights of man. The protection they afford to life and property compensates fully for the deprivation, impairment, or curtailment of such natural rights. Urban communities need more government and sterner rule than country districts. The former need a head, who is always on duty, with full power to preserve the peace and protect the weak. The latter are sufficiently protected by the character of the people, the want of attraction to the lawless classes, and the general laws of the State to be enforced by the courts. Hence the executive of a city is a peace officer of the community. The legislative branch cannot always be in session. So its powers should be limited to prescribing laws for the punishment of offenders against the peace, health, morality, and good government of the body corporate. As the executive is always on duty and generally busy, his powers should be large and liberally construed, and he should be in fact, as well as in name, the chief officer of the municipality. The business of any other branch should be to aid him, support him, and advise with him, and it should be left to the courts or the people to punish him for excesses or abuses of authority. To enable him properly and harmoniously to carry out the principles of local rule, he should be allowed to select his staff of assistants. His choice should only be restrained or overruled where he has plainly violated the American idea of honesty, fidelity, and fitness in selecting his aids.

As governments are necessary for protection, and as taxes can only be justified on the theory of protection, so the plan of a city government should be to give to the person specially charged with the duty of protecting the citizens all needed powers, while the expenditure of the people's money, which should be done with deliberation, ought to be left to the legislative, or, properly, the business, portion of the government.

We frequently hear that politics should have no place in municipal affairs. Politics, properly understood, means only the science of government—the regulation and government of the State, the preservation of its safety, peace, and prosperity, the protection of its citizens in their rights, with the preservation and improvement

of their morals. If these are objects worthy of national interest, why are they not equally desirable of attainment and observance in local matters? To achieve them is the purpose of all governments, national, State, and local. For such purposes alone taxes are levied. How to accomplish such beneficial results is a question of as much concern, proportionately, in local matters as it is in national. The protection of the people, and the expenditure of the people's money to secure that protection, are the sole object and purpose of both. If the wisdom of our forefathers and the experience of over a century have satisfied us that these ends can only be attained by the fundamental doctrine of a division of powers in the nation, why does not the same hold good in municipal governments? In St. Louis it has been tried and it is confidently believed that with a very few modifications, which experience and time will accomplish, the problem of the government of cities has been solved in its present charter.

EDWARD A. NOONAN,
Mayor of St. Louis.